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INTRODUCTION 
 
The operationalization of human rights is often framed by complex procedural           
requirements tied to forms of state recognition. This, however, becomes especially           
complicated where questions of identity or status are implicated. An obvious example is the              
right to religious freedom, which encompasses the right to choose and change one’s religion              
identity. In this respect, the administrative link between one’s religious identity and the             
state’s ​recognition of that identity is particularly important where a change in religion affects              
one’s status vis-à-vis religious laws or institutions (e.g. privileged access to religious            
education or benefits and whether one is subject to the jurisdiction of religious courts or               
authorities). The balance between a fundamental right to religious self-identification and the            
administrative procedures surrounding state recognition is a delicate one. When do           
administrative procedures amount to an excessive burden and, thus, a violation of one’s right              
to religious self-identification? When do state-based procedures amount to an infringement           
on fundamental rights? 
Within this context, cases of religious conversion are multi-dimensional. On the one            
hand, conversion is tied to religious profession as a fundamental right. On the other hand,               
such cases often involve forms of state recognition with all of the administrative requirements              
this entails: notarized declarations, detailed paperwork, bureaucratic discretion, and so on.           
These hurdles move beyond the question of religious profession to include both the             
manifestation and the ​recognition of one’s religious identity within the public realm. Human             
rights advocates typically describe the right to profess a specific religion or belief (religious              
self-identification) as absolute. Matters of manifestation, however, are subject to constraints           3
established by law. This article concerns the realm of administrative constraint—constraints           
tied to the very procedures that allow states to ​recognize​ one’s religious identity. 
A brief example will help to illustrate this link between fundamental rights and             
administrative procedures. In 2009, the U.K. Supreme Court decided a case involving a boy              
who applied for admission to a prominent school in London known as the Jewish Free               
1 Matthew Nelson (PhD, Columbia) is a Reader in Politics at the School of Oriental and African                 
Studies (SOAS), University of London.  
2 Dian A. H. Shah (SJD, Duke) is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Asian Legal Studies in the                    
Faculty of Law at the National University of Singapore and a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of                   
Malaya. 
3 Nurjaanah Abdullah, ​Legislating Faith in Malaysia​, ​SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD.​ ​264, 274 (2007). 
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School. The boy had a Jewish father and a mother who converted to Judaism under the                4
supervision of a Masorti (Conservative) rabbi. However, the school had a preferential            
admissions policy that emphasized Orthodox ideas about descent from an Orthodox mother            
(or her conversion by an Orthodox rabbi) rather than the child’s religious belief or practice.               
Because the school’s policy focused on maternal descent rather than religious belief or             
practice, the Court ruled that the school’s admissions policy violated British laws against             
ethnic or racial discrimination. In effect, the school rejected a “self-identification” standard            5
and the Court rejected a “descent-based” standard for determining Jewishness; the Court            
ordered the school to develop a new ​procedure for judging who was (and who was not) a Jew                  
for the purpose of admission. In other words, the state required a new set of administrative                
procedures to facilitate a legally binding approach to the ​recognition​ of religious identity.  
Administrative procedures are ubiquitous in cases of religious recognition. But what           
counts as a “reasonable” procedural burden? We argue that administrative and procedural            
burdens are an inevitable feature of state recognition. However, we also stress that, insofar as               
this is the case, historically and politically contingent questions of administrative           
“reasonableness” are baked into the constitutional operationalization of basic rights.          
Administrative procedures connect matters of religious self-identification to patterns of state           
recognition, but in postcolonial countries with some attachment to British common-law           
traditions like Malaysia, efforts to determine the “reasonableness” of those procedures—and,           
therein, the practical ​operationalization of religious freedom—continue to reflect the political           
elasticity associated with Britain’s “political” constitution. The operationalization of         6
fundamental rights pertaining to religious freedom, we argue, varies across time and space             
owing to the presence of politically inflected ideas about what counts as a “reasonable”              
administrative procedure.  
Since the landmark decision in ​Smith ​and ​Grady v. the United Kingdom (1999), which              
followed shortly after the promulgation of Britain’s new Human Rights Act (1998), British             
courts have shifted their assessment of administrative procedures that might restrict the            
enjoyment of an individual right. They have slowly moved away from the rather deferential              
Wednesbury “unreasonableness” test (according to which an administrative act is respected           
unless it becomes so capricious, perverse, or absurd that “no reasonable authority could have              
… come to it” ) in favour of a more rigorous “proportionality” test (within which policy               7
makers and administrative actors must show that the limitations they impose are offset by a               
“proportional” enhancement of some legitimate public interest). Some argue that this shift            8
4 ​R (E) v Governing Body of JFS & Others,​ U.K.S.C. 15(2009). 
5 ​Id., ​per Lord Clarke at paras. 131 and 148. 
6 ​See J.A.G. Griffith, ​The Political Constitution​, ​MODERN L. REV. 42 (1979), 1; Adam Tomkins, ​The                
Role of the Courts in the Political Constitutio​n, 60 (1) ​UNIV. TORONTO L. J. 1 (2010); Thomas Poole, ​The                   
Reformation of English Administrative Law​, 68 (1) ​CAMBRIDGE L. J.​  142 (2009). 
7 ​Associated Provincial​ ​Picture Houses Ltd​. ​v Wednesbury​ ​Corporation​ 1 K.B. 223 (1948) ​at 234.  
8 For an account of this shift from ​Wednesbury reasonableness to proportionality, ​see G.L. Peiris,               
Wednesbury Unreasonableness: The Expanding Canvas​, 46 (1) ​CAMBRIDGE L. J. 53 (1987). Also, turning to               
regarding fundamental rights, ​see Jeffrey Jowell and A. Lester, ​Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of              
Administrative Law​, ​PUBLIC LAW 368 (1987); Clive Lewis, ​The European Convention, Proportionality, and the              
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has altered the traditional balance of power between the political (administrative) and judicial             
arms of British constitutionalism, privileging more centralized forms of judicial power and a             
relatively more static understanding of human rights—a source of gratification for some and             
lamentation for others. Yet, in respecting Britain’s political constitution, the sovereignty of            9
parliament, and the power of an elected government and its civil servants, both approaches              
continue to leave a great deal of room for politics and administrative discretion. The              
operationalization of basic rights is never free-standing; either way, it remains closely tied to              
a judicial assessment of executive (administrative) action.  
In what follows we focus on one case of religious conversion and state-based             
religious recognition in Malaysia—the famous case of ​Lina Joy​. In this case, historically             10
and politically contingent notions of administrative “reasonableness” emerged as a crucial           
variable in the operationalization of religious liberty. In Britain, the administrative action            
associated with this case—a refusal to accept the self-identification of a Muslim-to-Christian            
convert without the corresponding completion of specific bureaucratic procedures         
(procedures that remained undefined, indeed, without any covering legislation         
whatsoever)—might have been judged in terms of “proportionality” because a fundamental           
right (religious freedom) was at stake. The government might have been required to stress a               
“public interest” in avoiding legislative or administrative support for conversions on the            
say-so of would-be converts owing to concerns, for instance, that (potentially reiterative)            
conversions might be motivated by a malafide effort to avoid this or that religious personal               
law. However, in ​Lina Joy​, this concern for “proportionality” was not in play. Although              
Malaysia inherited both the common law tradition and numerous Westminster conventions,           
requiring a would-be convert named Lina Joy to complete a set of non-existent bureaucratic              
procedures was considered “reasonable” by a majority of Malaysia’s Federal Court           
proceeding within the terms of Malaysia’s federal constitution—ultimately, the supreme law           
of the land. Hence the question that motivates our examination of religious freedom: what do               
judicial notions of administrative “reasonableness” mean for the operationalization of basic           
rights and, as an inescapable empirical corollary, what does administrative “reasonableness”           
mean in the specific context of​ Malaysia​?  11
The argument we develop, regarding the role played by administrative procedures in            
the operationalization and regulation of human rights, is not confined to Malaysia. It extends              
to Jews in London, Christians in the U.S., and many others. In the recent case of ​Burwell vs.                  
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed closely held             
companies and non-profit organizations articulating strong religious beliefs to claim an           
exemption from a government-supported national health insurance scheme covering         
Broadcasting Ban​, 50 (2) ​CAMBRIDGE L. J. 211 (1991); Julian Rivers, ​Proportionality and Variable Intensity of                
Review​, 65 (1) ​CAMBRIDGE L. J.​ 174 (2006); and  Poole, ​supra ​note 4. 
9 ​See for e.g,​ Jowell and Lester, ​supra​ note 6; Tomkins, ​supra ​note 4; and Poole, ​supra ​note 4.  
10 ​Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor​, 4 ​MALAY. L. J.​ 585 (2007). 
11 ​See​ Joshua Neoh, ​Islamic State and the Common Law in Malaysia: A Case Study of Lina Joy​, ​GLOBAL 
JURIST​ 8 (2008). 
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contraceptive services (“Obamacare”). After the Supreme Court decided to allow such           12
exemptions, however, some religious groups objected to the administrative procedures          
involved in submitting their claims. A religious school known as Wheaton College, for             
example, argued that the government-issued forms they were required to complete (to claim             
an exemption) posed a substantial burden on their religious beliefs. In fact, moving beyond              
their right to ​profess a particular belief, the Court was asked to consider the “reasonableness”               
of the administrative procedures underpinning the state’s ​recognition of that belief. Again the             
question was familiar: When do the administrative procedures associated with a state’s            
recognition of religious identity amount to an “unreasonable” infringement and, thus, a            
violation of one’s fundamental rights?  
Increasingly, ​the U.S. Supreme Court has intervened, ​within individual states, to           
regulate the administrative procedures (e.g. the official forms) pertaining to intersecting           
federal and state-based rights like religious freedom, access to healthcare, and marriage.            13
But, for a range of specific historical and political reasons we illuminate, Malaysia’s Federal              
Court has shied away from any similar assertion of federal supremacy in cases involving              
Muslim apostasy. In fact, even as Malaysia has avoided more rigorous “proportionality” tests             
to judge the permissibility of administrative restrictions on a fundamental right to religious             
self-identification (in favour of more deferential “reasonableness” tests), the trajectory of           
Malaysia’s courts in matters of Muslim apostasy has ​also rejected a federal doctrine stressing              
principles of federal supremacy (in favour of a focus on state-level subsidiarity). In short,              14
the civil courts have typically deferred to state-level shari’ah courts and the administrative             
purview of state-level religious authorities in matters of Muslim apostasy (and Islamic law             
jurisdiction more generally). The question for the Federal Court has simply concerned the             
degree to which decisions taken by state-level officials have been “reasonable.” 
When Wheaton College claimed that its articulation of religious identity was           
frustrated by an undue administrative burden, its claim was tied to the content of particular               
forms (such that a change in content was expected to nullify the complaint). By contrast, in                15
Lina Joy​, the claim of unreasonableness was considerably more complicated. As noted above,             
the claim of unreasonableness was related to the state’s insistence that, before it could              
formalize the self-identification of a Muslim-to-Christian convert named Lina Joy, Joy would            
have to complete a series of administrative procedures—​procedures that did not yet exist​.             
This burden struck many as unreasonable. And, yet, for richly contextualized reasons deeply             
rooted in Malaysia’s constitutional, legal, and political history (specifically, judicial efforts to            
avoid preempting the constitutionally recognized bodies charged with defining and enforcing           
12 ​Burwell vs. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., ​573 U.S. ___ (2014). 
13 ​See ​Jeffrey A. Redding, Formal Marriage (2016) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
14 This approach reflects the view of the U.S. Supreme Court in ​Erie Railroad v. Tompkins ​[1938],                 
urging U.S. federal judges faced with overlapping federal and state-level jurisdictions to privilege state rather               
than federal laws to discourage forum-shopping. 
15 On ​Hobby Lobby​, ​Wheaton College​, and “[f]orms and paper … far removed from the pomp and                 
circumstance usually accompanying the high judicial art of pronouncing on rights”, ​see Redding, ​supra ​note 11                
at 3. “Paper forms”, Redding notes, are “a new and hotly contested frontier mediating the relationship between                 
religion and state.” Redding, ​supra ​note 11 at 1. 
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relevant statutes and procedures), this burden was judged to be “reasonable”.   16
 
In what follows, we highlight the role that administrative procedures play in the             
operationalization of religious freedom. We do so by illuminating the persistent role that             
historically and politically contingent notions of “reasonableness” play in the judicial           
assessment of administrative procedures—specifically, the procedures that underpin official         
recognition of religious identity within Malaysia’s (federated) states. 
To locate ​Lina Joy in the literature on human rights and administrative            
“reasonable-ness,” this article offers a close reading of the case in three parts. Part I describes                
the legal, political, and administrative landscape of Malaysia as this relates to issues of              
religious conversion away from Islam, drawing special attention to Malaysia’s federal           
structure and its dual court system involving (a) a hierarchy of civil courts (including the               
Malaysian Federal Court) as well as (b) a hierarchy of state-level shari‘ah courts overseen by               
state-level sultans who function as the constitutional Heads of Islam in their respective states.              
Beyond this dual court system, some attention is also paid to the constitutional limits faced by                
Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts (in terms of their punitive jurisdiction) and, since 1988,             
the limits faced by Malaysia’s civil courts—including the Federal Court—vis-à-vis their           
review of state-level judgments pertaining to shari‘ah. 
Part I also examines the role of state-level statutory enactments pertaining to Islamic             
law in matters of Muslim apostasy, along with the role of Malaysia’s Department of Islamic               
Development, or JAKIM, now located in the Prime Minister’s Office. With political support             
from JAKIM, several Malaysian state legislatures have introduced broadly similar          
administrative procedures pertaining to Muslim personal law, including Muslim laws          
concerning marriage, divorce, and conversion ​to Islam. This push in the direction of national              
legislative standards, however, has not affected conversions ​away from Islam. In fact,            
different Malaysian states continue to address this issue in different ways, with            
some—including the Federal Territories in which the case of ​Lina Joy emerged—failing to             
address it at all. As a constitutional, administrative, and political matter, this is the statutory               
lacuna that mattered (vis-à-vis questions of “reasonableness”) in the case of ​Lina Joy​.  
Part II provides a detailed reading of ​Lina Joy​, highlighting the ways in which Joy’s               
lawyers and the Federal Court opted to set aside explicit fundamental rights claims in favour               
of a specific focus on the administrative procedures whereby Joy’s religious identity was to              
be formally recognized (or not). Particular attention is paid to the statutory lacuna mentioned              
above and, within this, the view that expecting Joy to complete a set of (as-yet-non-existent)               
forms was historically and politically “reasonable.”  
Part III examines the literature seeking to explain this judgment of “reasonableness”.            
Joy herself suggested that the actions of the National Registration Department (NRD)            
charged with issuing national ID cards that listed one’s religious identity—actions closely            
tied to the statutory lacuna mentioned above—were a “trick” designed to prevent any official              
16 ​Lina Joy, supra ​note 7 at 607 – 8. 
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recognition of her religious conversion. Others, however, trace this lacuna to an intrinsic             17
problem within Islamic law—in effect, an intrinsic aversion within the substantive law            
overseen by Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts to any form of Muslim apostasy. There is,              
however, a third explanation—a more explicitly ​political explanation—that turns away from           
the NRD and Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts to explain the lacuna preventing            
state-based recognition for Joy’s conversion. One version of this more political explanation            
focuses on enduring patterns of polarization between Malaysia’s conservative and liberal           
Muslims—patterns of polarization in which policy-makers and judges fear that any effort to             
confront the issue of Muslim apostasy in Malaysia’s Federal Territories (via legislation)            
might provoke violent clashes. Others have argued that the lacuna frustrating Lina Joy’s             18
quest for state-based recognition merely reflects a politically motivated effort to appease, not             
Muslims​, but ​non-Muslims​. Here, special attention has been paid to the work of those seeking               
to prevent the legal prohibition of Muslim apostasy, noting that such a prohibition would              
merely prevent erstwhile ​non-Muslims who had converted to Islam from reverting back to             
their original faith.  19
After considering these alternative explanations for the procedural lacuna that          
frustrated Lina Joy, we draw on specific features of Malaysia’s constitutional and political             
history to flesh out a set of Malaysian ideas about what constitutes a “reasonable” set of                
administrative procedures governing Muslim apostasy within Malaysia’s constitutional order.         
In particular, we highlight a number of empirical variables linking fundamental rights to the              
historical and political contingencies underpinning ​Malaysian modes of formal state          
recognition for religious identity. We do not set aside the issue of fundamental             
rights—already examined at some length in the existing literature. Instead, we argue that an              
historically and politically nuanced understanding of administrative “reasonableness” ​in         
Malaysia is essential for those with an interest in the operationalization of fundamental rights              
in the case of Lina Joy. 
In Malaysia, the Federal Court insisted that specific bureaucratic         
procedures—procedures grounded in deeply contextualized notions of administrative        
“reasonableness”—need not imply a total denial of constitutionally protected religious          
liberty. In fact the Chief Justice who delivered the majority decision did not categorically              
reject the possibility of a Muslim’s renunciation of Islam; he merely suggested that any              
person seeking to leave Islam must follow the relevant ​procedures​. In short, he noted that               20
religious freedom was protected so long as each actor—elected representatives, bureaucratic           
officials, and private citizens—followed the rules set out to create (and adhere to) relevant              
procedures. Once Joy had fulfilled the procedures to renounce Islam, and the relevant Islamic              
authorities had “authorized” her apostasy, the Chief Justice suggested that she was free to              
17 ​Lina Joy, supra ​note 7 at 620. 
18 See Tamir Moustafa, ​The Politics of Religious Freedom in Malaysi​a, 28 MARYLAND J. INT’L L. ​129                 
(2013). 
19 See Kikue Hamayotsu, ​Once a Muslim, Always a Muslim: The Politics of State Enforcement of                
Syariah in Contemporary Malaysia​, 20 ​SOUTH EAST ASIA RES.​ 399 (2012). 
20 ​Id.​ at 618. 
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embrace the religion of her choice.   21
Focusing on the operationalization of fundamental rights in a highly charged context            
shaped by religious norms, we argue that the operationalization of fundamental rights is             
politically contingent; it is contingent precisely insofar as it is channeled through official             
procedures framed by deeply contextualized notions of administrative “reasonableness.”         
Political considerations, if you will, often underpin formal ​legal assessments of           
administrative “reasonableness”—assessments that, in turn, shape the operationalization of         
each state’s recognition of a fundamental right to religious self-identification.  
 
I. CONTEXTUALIZING MUSLIM CONVERSION IN MALAYSIA 
 
In order to understand the legal context within which ​Lina Joy’s effort to obtain state               
recognition for her religious conversion unfolded, it is necessary to grasp certain features of              
Malaysia’s federal constitution. The British colony of Malaya achieved its independence in            
1957 from a set of territories known as the Straits Settlements as well as the Federated and                 
Unfederated Malay States. The Straits Settlements (Malacca, Penang, Singapore, and          
Dindings) were directly administered by the British Crown, and in those settlements the terms              
of Muslim personal law were closely tied to Anglo-Mohammadan law as it developed in              
British India. In the Federated and Unfederated Malay states, however, British representatives            
worked with regional sultans, who retained ​de jure sovereignty with respect to both Muslim              
law and Malay custom.   22
During Malaya’s anti-colonial nationalist movement, many regional sultans were         
allied with United Malays National Organization (UMNO). And, in Malaya, this pattern of             23
political collaboration culminated in a constitutional settlement that provided for a dual court             
system, separating the country’s centralized “civil” courts from its state-level “Muslim”           
courts. Malaya was renamed Malaysia in 1963 after the removal of Singapore and, during the               
1980s, the country’s Muslim courts (previously known as “qadhi” or “kadi” courts) were             
recast as state-level “shari‘ah” courts.   24
Departing from the postcolonial experience of South Asia, the ​de jure sovereignty of             
Malaysia’s regional sultans with respect to Islamic law and the country’s shari‘ah courts was              
preserved in Malaysia’s Federal Constitution, which also stipulates in Article 3 that “Islam is              
the religion of the Federation” while, at the same time, protecting religious freedom subject              25
to “public order” and certain other considerations. Initially, many of Malaya’s regional            26
sultans objected to Article 3, believing it would encroach on their religious authority within              
21 ​Id.​ at 612. 
22 ​ANDREW HARDING, LAW, GOVERNMENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN MALAYSIA​ 13 (1993). 
23 ​See generally Hari Singh, ​UMNO Leaders and Malay Rulers: The Erosion of a Special Relationship​,                
68 ​PACIFIC AFFAIRS​ 187 (1995). 
24 Malaysia’s states have three tiers of shari‘ah courts: subordinate courts, high courts, and appeal 
courts. 
25 ​See ​CONST. OF MALAYSIA (1957), art. 3 (Malay.). 
26 ​See ​CONST. OF MALAYSIA (1957), art. 11(5) (Malay.). 
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their respective states. However, when it was explained that Article 3 was effectively a              27
symbolic article—indeed, that the religious authority of regional (state-level) sultans would           
remain firmly intact—they accepted it. Separate constitutional articles define the ethnic           28
category “Malay” as composed of persons who profess Islam while, at the same time,              29
providing that certain Islamic matters will be governed by state-level shari‘ah courts overseen             
by the country’s regional sultans. Together, these articles mean that matters concerning            30
Islam and Muslim personal law are inextricably tied to the terms of Malaysian federalism              
and, thus, a delicate balance between Malaysia’s central government, Malaysia’s sultans, and            
each state-level legislature. 
The jurisdiction of Malaysia’s shari‘ah courts is limited to matters allocated to them             
by the constitution and state-level legislative action. This legislative action, whether in the             31
form of a legislative enactment or a fatwa issued by a state-level Mufti, is subject to approval                 
by the relevant state-level sultan before it can be gazetted and transformed into an              
enforceable law. In Malaysia’s Federal Territories (e.g. in the Malaysian capital of Kuala             
Lumpur), the pattern is similar to that in territories like Washington, D.C.: local             
institutions—including shari‘ah courts—exist, but it is the federation that oversees them. In            
fact, it is not a state-level sultan but Malaysia’s Yang di-Pertuan Agong (a “king” elected on                
a rotating basis from amongst Malaysia’s regional sultans) who oversees the “state-level”            
shari‘ah courts in Federal Territories like Kuala Lumpur. This point is important, because             32
the case of ​Lina Joy​ originated in Kuala Lumpur. 
 
A. Muslim Conversion: Legal Debates 
The issue of Muslim apostasy or conversion away from Islam—pertaining both to            
constitutional issues like religious freedom and to state-level shari‘ah enactments —was          33 34
initially perched ​in between Malaysia’s civil courts (protecting fundamental rights) and           
Malaysia’s shari‘ah courts, with the civil courts maintaining powers of judicial review.            
However, in 1988, a constitutional amendment (Article 121(1A)) was passed to provide the             
shari’ah courts with exclusive jurisdiction in matters specified under List II (Paragraph One)             
27 Dian A. H. Shah, “Constitutionalizing Religion and Religious Freedom: A Comparative Study of              
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka” 266 (2014) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file with               
Duke University Library). 
28 ​JOSEPH M. FERNANDO, THE MAKING OF THE MALAYAN CONSTITUTION 171 (2006). ​See also, ​Shah, ​supra                
note 26 at 92. 
29 ​See ​CONST. OF MALAYSIA (1957), art. 160 (2). 
30 ​See ​CONST. OF MALAYSIA (1957), art. 74. This provision clarifies the legislative powers of               
Malaysia’s federal and state-level governments with reference to the “federal”, “state”, and “concurrent”             
legislative lists set out in the constitution’s Ninth Schedule. 
31 ​See ​CONST. OF MALAYSIA (1957), Ninth Schedule, List II. 
32 For a discussion of the legal, political, and administrative structures surrounding Islamic law in               
Malaysia, ​see Farid S. Shuaib, ​The Islamic Legal System in Malaysia​, ​PACIFIC RIM L. & POL’Y J. 85 (​2012), 85                    
and Farid S. Shuaib, ​Strengthening Administrative Institutions of Islamic Law in Malaysia: An Overview​, 16               
JURNAL SYARIAH​ 443 (2008).  
33 ​See ​CONST. OF MALAYSIA (1957), art.11 (Malay.). 
34 ​See ​CONST. OF MALAYSIA (1957), Ninth Schedule (Malay.) 
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of the constitution’s Ninth Schedule (namely, the personal and family law of persons             
professing the religion of Islam). The effect of this amendment on civil court powers of               35
judicial review has been a subject of extensive legal debate: some believe this amendment              
bars the civil courts from reviewing shari‘ah-court judgments; others insist that the civil             
courts retain such powers, particularly in cases involving an interpretion of constitutional            
provisions.   36
Even apart from this amendment, however, there are federal statutory limits on the             
punitive powers of Malaysia’s state-level shari’ah courts: up to three years imprisonment,            
fines of MYR5000, and six lashes. Although cases of Muslim apostasy are handled by              37
Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts (including those in the Federal Territories), then, those            
courts are not able to impose capital punishment. In fact, even before ​Lina Joy​, Malaysia’s               38
Supreme Court (now Federal Court) declared that, with reference to Muslim apostasy, each             
state legislature was required to define a state-level shari‘ah-court ​procedure to govern the             
process—up to and including discretionary efforts to ​deter apostasy within state-level           
punitive limits. If states ​failed to specify any applicable procedure, the Court held that this               39
did not actually prohibit Muslim apostasy; instead, the Court noted that recalcitrant state             
legislatures (or, in the Federal Territories, parliament itself) were still required to frame             
statutory rules for their sultans (or the king) to endorse. This ruling stemmed from the fact                
that, according to the constitution’s Ninth Schedule, explicit ​legislation was required to            
endow state-level shari‘ah courts with jurisdiction over issues mentioned in the state-level            
legislative list. Even then, state-level legislatures did not have the authority to enact just any               
35 ​See ​CONST. OF MALAYSIA (1957), art, 121-1A and Ninth Schedule (Malay.) List II (Paragraph               
One) describes the jurisdiction of states: It covers, “​[e]xcept with respect to the Federal Territories of Kuala                 
Lumpur, Labuan, and Putrajaya, [the] Islamic law and personal and family law of persons professing the                
religion of Islam, including the … creation and punishment of offences by persons professing the religion of                 
Islam against precepts of that religion, except in regard to matters included in the Federal List; [as well as] the                    
constitution, organisation and procedure of Syariah courts, which shall have jurisdiction only over persons              
professing the religion of Islam and in respect only of any of the matters included in this paragraph, but shall not                     
have jurisdiction in respect of offences except in so far as conferred by federal law […].” 
36 ​See ​ANDREW HARDING, THE CONSTITUTION OF MALAYSIA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS​ 203 (2012); Shad 
Saleem ​FARUQI, DOCUMENT OF DESTINY: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA  (2008)​; ​Lina Joy, supra 
note 7 at 630 (dissenting opinion of Justice Richard Malanjum). 
37 Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965. 
38 Within Islamic law, the punishment for apostasy is debated. This issue is not explicitly addressed in                 
the Qu’ran; it emerges in various hadith (sayings of the Prophet Mohammad), and historically different               
“schools” of Muslim jurisprudence have stressed different punishments. ​See ​generally, ​Frank Griffel, ​Toleration             
and Exclusion: Al-Shafi’i and al-Ghazali on the Treatment of Apostates​, 84(3) ​BULLETIN OF SOAS 339 (2001),                
and ​YOHANNAN FRIEDMANN, TOLERANCE AND COERCION IN ISLAM: INTERFAITH RELATIONS IN THE MUSLIM TRADITION              
121-59 ​(2003). In 1990 Kelantan’s Chief Minister (PAS) pressed for the imposition of capital punishment.               
UMNO suggested a constitutional amendment to enhance the jurisdiction of state-level courts (thereby avoiding              
accusations of standing in the way of shari‘ah); but this idea was later withdrawn. See Andrew Harding, ​The                  
Keris, the Crescent and the Blind Goddess: The State, Islam and the Constitution in Malaysia​, 6 ​SINGAPORE J.                  
INT’L & COMP. L.​ 154, 176-7 ​(2002). 
39 ​See generally, ​Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam &               
Another,​ 1 ​MALAY. L. J.​ ​1 (1992). 
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law pertaining to Islam; they were limited to Islamic matters spelled out in Paragraph One of                
List II. Without enabling ​legislation​, in other words, Article 121-1A was not sufficient, on              40
its own, to empower or guide the procedural action of Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts. 
Since 1988, however, several court cases have sought to clarify the relationship            
between Malaysia’s federal structure and the question of fundamental rights (with particular            
reference to the question of Muslim apostasy). These cases framed the environment within             
which ​Lina Joy​ emerged.  
In 1991, the High Court was asked to decide whether a person from Selangor who had                
allegedly converted ​to Islam had died as a Muslim. The Court concluded that, because              41
neither the Selangor Administration of Muslim Law Enactment (1952) nor the Islamic Family             
Law (Federal Territories) Act (1984) specifically mentioned the issue of conversion—in           
other words, because there was no explicit legislation endowing Selangor’s shari’ah courts            
with jurisdiction over this issue—the matter should be heard by a (civil) High Court instead.               42
However, in 1992, this view was modified in the case of ​Dalip Kaur​, ​a case concerning the                 
status of a man from Kedah who was said to have converted ​out ​of Islam before he passed                  
away. In this case, the Supreme Court declared that the civil courts could not assume               43
jurisdiction, because matters of Muslim apostasy required a detailed assessment by a            
qualified religious authority. Still, the Kedah Administration of Muslim Law Enactment           44
(1952) did not clarify the procedural mechanism whereby Muslims might leave Islam            
(indeed, there was no explicit legislation clarifying the jurisdiction of Kedah’s shari‘ah courts             
in cases of Muslim apostasy at all) so, in the end, the Court found that Kedah’s civil courts                  
were, by default, empowered to render a binding decision.  45
In 1998, however, the High Court adopted an entirely different approach, holding in             
Mohammad Hakim Lee ​that, even where explicit state-level legislation conferring           46
jurisdiction on state-level shari’ah courts in matters of Muslim apostasy did not exist, there              
was no justification for granting default jurisdiction to the civil courts. On the contrary,              47
according to Idrus Bin Harun (a parliamentary draftsman in the office of the Malaysian              
Attorney General), ​Md Hakim Lee held that jurisdiction in matters of Muslim apostasy lay              
with state-level shari‘ah courts given their jurisdiction over Muslim religious affairs (as per             
Article 121-1A), “even if no express provisions were provided in [a state-level statute].”             48
Muslim apostasy was left to state-level shari‘ah courts, in other words, on the expectation that               
40 ​FARUQI​, ​supra​ note 34 at 134 . 
41 ​Ng Wan Chan v. Majlis Ugama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Another (No 2) ​1 ​MALAY. L. J. 487                   
(1991) 
42 ​Id. ​at 490. 
43 ​Dalip Kaur, supra ​note 39. 
44 ​Id.​ at 9 (concurring opinion by Justice Mohamed Yusoff). 
45 ​Id.​ at 7. 
46 ​Md Hakim Lee v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur,​ ​1 ​MALAY. L. J. ​681                
(1998). 
47 ​Id.​ at 689. 
48 ​Dato Idrus bin Harun, ​“Interaction between Syariah Law and Civil Law.” Paper presented at the                
Inaugural Annual Events (IAE) of the AGCs, March 23 – 25, 2006, Singapore.  
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explicit legislative guidance regarding appropriate procedures would emerge at a later date:            
“The fact that the plaintiff might not have [an explicit] remedy in the syariah courts,” noted                
Harun, “would not make the jurisdiction exercisable by [a civil] High Court.”  49
This view was later reinforced in a landmark case known as ​Soon Singh, wherein it               50
was found that although each state (including the Federal Territories) had explicit laws             
covering conversion ​to Islam, only some had provided their shari‘ah courts with explicit             
jurisdiction over conversions ​away from Islam. In ​Soon Singh, however, the Federal Court             51
concluded that, in cases of Muslim apostasy, the jurisdiction of state-level shari‘ah courts             
could be ​implied given the special religious expertise required to judge such cases. This              52
approach was expanded in a subsequent case known as ​Shaik Zolkaffily​, where the Federal              53
Court held that if jurisdiction over a specific issue had been conferred upon the shari‘ah               
courts—either explicitly or implicitly—but no legal remedy had been specified within those            
courts, it was nevertheless for the state legislature to outline a remedy within the shari’ah               
courts. In other words, recalling ​Md Hakim Lee​, “the fact that [a litigant] did not have his                 54
remedy in the syariah court would not make the jurisdiction exercisable by the civil court.”               55
This is the jurisprudential background that set the stage for ​Lina Joy​.  
During the 1980s and 1990s several states introduced legislation specifying a           
procedure concerning Muslim apostasy to be overseen by their state-level shari‘ah courts. In             
Pahang, Perak, Malacca, and Sabah, these enactments identified Muslim apostasy as an            
offense (e.g. an insult to Islam) to be punished with fines and/or imprisonment. By contrast,               56
in Negeri Sembilan, steps were put in place allowing state-level shari‘ah courts to oversee the               
process of Muslim apostasy (including three months of counselling and a further cooling-off             
period of one year) before a certificate of conversion was issued. And, in Johor, the               57
unreported case of ​Ismail bin Suppiah noted that, as per the (now-repealed) Johor             58
Administration of Islamic Law Enactment (1978), the chief kadi was expected to play a              
purely mechanical role in registering the new name of any Johor-based Muslim who declared              
him or herself an apostate. In the Federal Territories and at least four other states, however,                59
the issue of Muslim apostasy was not addressed at all. The question is: why did this statutory                 
(and, thus, procedural) lacuna persist and, moreover, why were the actions of bureaucratic             
officials requiring would-be converts to complete the procedures left ​missing by this lacuna             
49 ​Id. 
50 ​Soon Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah,​ ​1 ​MALAY. L. J.​ ​489 (1999). 
51 ​Id.​ at 501. 
52 ​Id.​ at 502. 
53 ​M​ajlis Ugama Islam Pulau Pinang dan Seberang Perai v Shaik Zolkaffily bin Shaik Natar &            
Others​, ​3 ​MALAY. L. J.​ ​705​ ​(2003). 
54 ​Id.​ at 719. 
55 ​Id​. 
56 ​See, for e.g., Crimes (Syariah) Enactment 1992 (Enactment No. 3 of 1992), ss. 12 and 13,                 
Administration of the Religion of Islam and the Malay Custom of Pahang Enactment 1982, ss. 103 and 185. 
57 Administration of the Religion of Islam (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 2003, s. 119. 
58 ​Ismail bin Suppiah v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara ​(R-1-24-31-95) (unreported case). 
59 ​See​ the Johor Faith Protection Bill 2000, which resembled a bill passed that year in Perlis. 
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seen as legally “reasonable”?  
 
B. Muslim Conversion: Political Debates 
Apart from this jurisprudential and legislative context, it is important to appreciate the             
larger political context within which cases of Muslim apostasy were addressed. Here, much             
depends on the electoral competition between two leading parties in Malaysia: the            
right-of-center United Malays National Organization (UMNO)—the dominant collaborator in         
a ruling coalition known as the Barisan Nasional (BN) or National Front—and the religiously              
conservative Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). Since its inception in the early 1950s, PAS has              
projected itself as the only truly “Islamic” party in Malaysia. In fact, for much of the                60
country’s history, and especially since the late 1970s when social and political movements             
took on a more overtly religious character, UMNO and PAS have competed for Muslim              
“religious” votes—especially in the north and east of the country (Malaysia’s Malay-Muslim            
“heartland”). Central to this competition has been a push to construct a cohesive Muslim              61
constituency by “defending” the boundaries of Islam or at least appearing to defend Muslim              
interests. In effect, UMNO and PAS have sought to “out-Islamize” one another by             
highlighting issues that touch on Muslim religious sensitivities.   62
This competitive religious-cum-political posture stretches from policing various forms         
of religious orthodoxy to discouraging Muslim apostasy. The government’s emphasis on           
Islam, for instance, was officially expressed during UMNO’s 1982 General Assembly, when            
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad stressed that UMNO would ensure Malay-Muslim          
adherence to various Islamic teachings. In fact, certain reform initiatives took place even             63
before Mahathir assumed office: at the federal level, the government established a National             
Council for Islamic Affairs (​Pusat Islam​) under the Department of Religion—a council that             
was later placed in the office of Prime Minister Mahathir as the Department for Islamic               
Development (JAKIM).   64
Within Malaysia, each state maintains its own Islamic affairs department. However,           
JAKIM has become increasingly influential in coordinating inter-state Muslim affairs          
(particularly insofar as states have become more and more reliant on funds derived from the               
centre). JAKIM recommends draft laws for enactment at the level of each state and plays an                65
important role in ongoing efforts to standardize Islamic law throughout the country.            
Theoretically, each state legislature as well as the ​Majlis Raja-Raja (Conference of Rulers) is              
entitled to ignore JAKIM’s advice—in fact, in 2001, when the ​Majlis Raja-Raja was             
consulted regarding JAKIM’s harmonization efforts, it accepted JAKIM’s suggestions in          
60 Andrew Harding, ​Sharia and National Law in Malaysia​, ​in ​SHARIA INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE              
OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF TWELVE MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN PAST AND PRESENT 491, 502-3 (Jan Michiel Otto                  
ed., 2010) 
61 Shah, ​supra ​note 26 at 344. 
62 ​Id.​ at 386. 
63 ​GORDON P. MEANS, POLITICAL ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA​ 126 (2009). 
64 ​Id. 
65 ​See ​Maznah Mohamad, ​The Ascendance of Bureaucratic Islam and the Secularization of the Sharia               
in Malaysia​, 83 ​PACIFIC AFFAIRS​ 505, 505 (2010). 
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several areas ​except Islamic criminal law. In practice, however, given its persistent political             66
dominance, both at a federal level and in several Malaysian states throughout the 1980s,              
1990s, and early 2000s (except in Kelantan, where PAS won state-level elections in 1990),              
the ruling BN working with JAKIM has found it relatively easy to encourage various forms               
of standardization in state-level laws related to the terms of Islam. Even ​within Malaysia’s              
federalized approach to Islam, in other words, close links between federal and state-level             
party politics have ensured that many shari‘ah-based policies have been slowly harmonised            
over time. Still, the question remains: why did accelerating patterns of standardization ​fail to              
touch sensitive “criminal” issues like Muslim apostasy? And, turning to the           
operationalization of human rights, why was the procedural lacuna left by this failure, in              
Kuala Lumpur, considered legally “reasonable”?  
 
II. UNDERSTANDING ​LINA JOY: ​FROM FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE “REASONABLENESS” 
 
By the time ​Lina Joy reached Malaysia’s Court of Appeal and, then, the Federal              
Court, Joy’s quest to obtain state recognition for her religious conversion—by deleting the             
word “Islam” from her national ID card—was clearly framed as a case of administrative law               
rather than fundamental rights. The facts were simple. Initially, Azalina binti Jailani (a.k.a.             
“Lina Joy”) applied to change the name on her ID card (which did not mention her religion),                 
stating the reason for this change as a “change of religion” from Islam to Christianity. Her                
application, however, was denied, and Joy was advised to apply again stating that the reason               
for her change of name was her “choice” of religion. This time her request was granted, and                 
she received a new ID card bearing her new name. 
Unfortunately, this new ID card also included her old name on the back. And, owing               
to a legislative amendment that came into effect while Joy’s application for a new ID card                
was being processed, her new card ​also described her religion as “Islam”. (The intervening              
piece of legislation specified that every national ID card must specify a Muslim’s religion as               
Islam; and, along the way, the National Registration Department [NRD] claimed that, while it              
recognized Joy’s new name, it had no authoritative documentary evidence stating that she had              
renounced Islam. ) When Joy later applied to delete the word “Islam” from her ID card, she                67
was ordered to follow the procedures spelled out in Malaysia’s National Registration            
Regulations 1990 (hereinafter, the “1990 Regulations”), which provided her with a set of             
forms requiring any Muslim applying for a change of name to specify their religion and, then,                
to provide “[a]ny further documentary evidence as the registration officer may consider            
necessary to support the accuracy of any particulars submitted.”  68
When Joy submitted her forms specifying her religion as “Kristian” (along with a             
copy of her baptismal certificate), the presiding NRD officer made a notation saying that the               
66 ​MEANS​, ​supra ​note 58 at 126. 
67 The same piece of legislation specified that, amongst the “reasons” given by those seeking to change                 
their name, “change of religion” was no longer permitted. 
68 National Registration Regulations 1990, clause 4(c)(x). 
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religion of the applicant should be retained as Islam because, scanning the NRD records,              
there was no authoritative documentary evidence stating that, before Joy became a Christian,             
she had officially abandoned Islam. As in the case of London’s Jewish Free School, a mere                69
assertion of religious identity by a private citizen (or, for that matter, a recognized religious               
authority—in this case, the church issuing Joy’s baptismal certificate) was not enough.            
Instead, the state required a three-way combination of individual self-assertion (i.e. individual            
profession), acknowledgement by a relevant religious authority (insofar each religious          
community in Malaysia was constitutionally entitled to “regulate its own affairs”), and above             
all, some type of formal procedure administered by the state itself. In Malaysia, following the               
“implied” jurisdiction of the state-level shari‘ah courts spelled out in ​Soon Singh​, it was this               
last element that figured most prominently in the case of ​Lina Joy​.  
Joy insisted that, as per the form she was asked to complete, her baptismal certificate               
was sufficient to support “[t]he accuracy of any particulars submitted,” since the particulars             70
actually submitted concerned her status as a Christian. However, the NRD contended that,             
insofar as Joy was seeking to delete the word Islam from her ID card (and, thus, to change her                   
status from what was in the NRD records), the only satisfactory evidence was a certificate of                
apostasy from a state-level shari‘ah court, a state-level Islamic Council, or a state-level             
Religious Affairs Department. Joy argued that, as a non-Muslim, she was not legally subject              71
to the jurisdiction of shari‘ah courts. However, the NRD argued that it was not her professed                
status as a Kristian but her earlier effort to abandon Islam that was at issue (in deleting the                  
word “Islam”). As such, the NRD argued that the procedure for adjudicating this act of               
renunciation—by implication, since the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories)          
Act (1993) did not explicitly mention Muslim apostasy—involved the work of a shari‘ah             
court.  72
In effect, recalling many of the cases balancing administrative procedures and           
fundamental rights in Europe or the U.K., the question before the Court became one              
involving a routine matter of administrative law, albeit one that underpinned the            
operationalization of a basic right. In Malaysia, however, the question was not subject to a               
test of “proportionality” (as it might have been in Europe or the U.K.). Instead it was subject                 
to a test of ​Wednesbury “unreasonableness”: Did the NRD act “unreasonably” and beyond             
69 ​Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan and Others,​ 6 ​MALAY. L. J.​ 193, 202 (2005). 
70 ​Lina Joy, supra ​note 7 at 629. 
71 ​Lina Joy, supra ​note 7 at 627. See also, Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, ​Law of Apostasy and                  
Freedom of Religion in Malaysia​, 2(1) ​ASIAN J. COMP. L. ​(2007). 
72 For analogous considerations regarding administrative law (and its implications for the protection of              
rights) in an American context, ​see Jerry L. Mashaw, ​Between Facts and Law: Agency Statutory Interpretation                
as an Autonomous Enterprise​, 55 ​UNIV. TORONTO L. J​. 497 (2005) and Cass R. Sunstein, ​Law and Administration                  
after Chevron​, 90 ​COLUMBIA L. R. 969 (1990). For arguments focusing on administrative law and fundamental                
rights in the British context, ​see ​M.C. Tolley, ​Judicial Review of Agency Interpretation of Statutes: Deference                
Doctrines in Comparative Perspective​, 31 ​POL’Y STUD. J. 421 (2003); Poole, ​supra ​note 4; and Jowell, ​supra                 
note 9. For arguments pressing for a more robust effort to protect individual religious freedom rights than the                  
turn to proportionality has so far allowed, ​see ​Nicholas Gibson, ​Faith in the Courts: Religious Dress and Human                  
Rights​, 66(3) ​CAMBRIDGE L. J.​  657 (2007).  
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the parameters of its administrative discretion when it required Joy to obtain a certificate of               
apostasy from the shari‘ah court before deleting the word Islam from her ID card? In fact,                
when it arrived in the Federal Court, this case was ​explicitly framed as a case of ​Wednesbury                 
unreasonableness, asking whether the decision taken by the NRD was wrong, capricious,            
perverse, or absurd—indeed, “[s]o unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have …            
come to it.”   73
The Federal Court, by a 2:1 majority, concurred with the Court of Appeal and              
concluded that the NRD had acted reasonably for at least three reasons. First, the majority               74
argued that the NRD’s insistence on authoritative evidence from the shari‘ah court            
confirming that Joy was no longer a Muslim was “reasonable.” In particular, the Chief              75
Justice argued that a simple declaration issued by a person leaving the religion was not               
enough. Because renouncing Islam implicated the terms of Islamic law, it was perfectly             76
reasonable for the NRD to require confirmation from Islamic authorities who were thought             
(by the state) to possess the expertise required to adjudicate such matters. In fact the Court                77
added that, if the NRD had simply accepted a person’s “self-declaration”, the NRD might risk               
“wrongly” designating a person’s religious affiliation.   78
Second, agreeing with the Court of Appeal, the Federal Court conceded that the             
relevant Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act (1993) granting jurisdiction           
to Kuala Lumpur’s shari‘ah courts did not provide any guidance regarding the procedures             
governing Muslim apostasy. Yet, following ​Soon Singh​, the Court declared that the            
jurisdiction of the shari‘ah courts was still implied. In fact, as per ​Md Hakim Lee​, all three                 79
justices accepted the view that the judiciary must avoid legislating on its own; the courts were                
simply obliged to encourage each state-level legislature to satisfy its legal role in specifying              
the relevant procedures. In effect, the Court argued that it was “reasonable” to expect each               80
actor within Malaysia’s constitutionally defined legal-cum-administrative apparatus to play         
its required part. The alternative—i.e. arrogating legislative powers to the Federal Court on             
the premise that a radical commitment to institutional centralization was required to ensure a              
defense of fundamental rights—was rejected, because such a move was seen as undermining,             
not only the separation of powers, but also the ​federalized underpinnings of Malaysia’s             
constitutional approach to religion.  81
Third, it is important to stress that the 1990 Regulations did not offer any clear               
73 ​Associated Provincial​ ​Picture Houses Ltd​. ​v Wednesbury​ ​Corporation​ 1 K.B. 223 (1948)​ ​at 234.  
74 This split decision reflects what Joshua Neoh has called “Islamic” and “common-law” 
constitutional-ism in Malaysia. See Neoh, ​supra​ note 9. 
75 ​Lina Joy, supra ​note 3 at 604. 
76 ​Id. 
77 For a related account focusing on judicial deference to specialist competencies, ​see Jeffrey Jowell,               
Judicial Deference and Human Rights: A Question of Competence​, ​in ​LAW AND ADMINISTRATION IN EUROPE 68                
(​Paul Craig and Richard Rawlings, eds., 2003). 
78 ​Lina Joy, supra ​note 3​ ​at 603. 
79 ​Id. ​at 616-18. 
80 ​Id. 
81 ​Lina Joy, supra ​note 7 at 618. 
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guidance as to what must be provided to correct erroneous particulars on an ID card. Instead,                
the Court declared that it was within the discretion of each NRD officer to determine which                
documentary evidence was required “[t]o support the accuracy of any particulars submitted”            82
and that, in cases of Muslim apostasy, it was entirely “reasonable” in light of prevailing               
jurisprudence to expect some type of certification from Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts.           
The Court stressed that determining the question of whether a person had renounced Islam               83
was not something “[t]he NRD is … equipped or qualified to decide.” In fact, the Court                84
opined that, even when a certificate of apostasy ​was furnished before the NRD, each NRD               
officer ​still possessed the discretion to retain or remove the word “Islam” from an ID card.                85
In ​Lina Joy​, the relationship between fundamental rights and administrative discretion (and            
the limitation of judicial interference vis-à-vis that discretion) was made abundantly clear. 
As noted above, the Court did not explicitly state that Lina Joy could not change her                
religion (in keeping with the fundamental rights outlined in Article 11 of the constitution). On               
the contrary, the Court simply concluded that Joy’s exercise of a right to religious identity               
was subject to the relevant regulations. In short, the exercise of one’s fundamental rights              86
under Article 11 (as a Muslim) could not occur unless specific procedures associated with the               
renunciation of Islam were followed—procedures closely tied to Malaysia’s federal          
constitutional order and the authority of its state-level shari‘ah courts.  
 
III. LINA JOY: ​RIGHTS VS. REASONABLENESS? 
 
Initially, Lina Joy argued that the NRD’s actions amounted to a form of trickery to               
prevent any state recognition of her conversion. In her submission at trial (in the High Court),                
Joy documented her interactions with the NRD: the NRD had rejected—without providing            
any reason—her first application for a change of name (explaining that she had renounced              
Islam), but when she put in a second application almost two years later (again citing her                
conversion), the NRD did not respond. She subsequently enquired about the status of her              87
application, whereupon she was told not to disclose her conversion to avoid any difficulty, so               
she submitted a third application, which was approved but with a new ID card specifying her                
religion as “Islam.” The dissenting judgment prepared by Justice Richard Malanjum drew            88
attention to this series of interactions. In fact, while addressing the issue of “reasonableness,”              
Malanjum argued that, within the terms of Malaysia’s existing policy framework, Joy had             
been faced with an impossible requirement.  
 
A. Proceduralizing Apostasy 
82 ​Id.​ at 603. 
83 ​Id. ​at 604. 
84 ​Id.​ at 602. 
85 ​Id. ​at 604. 
86 ​Id. ​at 612. 
87 ​Id. ​at 620. 
88 ​Id. ​at 621. 
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Malanjum began his dissenting judgment by accepting that the NRD official who            
handled Joy’s case was entitled to request any documentary evidence “[n]ecessary to support             
the accuracy of any particulars submitted.” He reiterated that the particulars actually            89
submitted concerned Joy’s identity as a Christian—hence her baptismal certificate—rather          
than her status as an ex-Muslim. There was an “abuse of power,” he noted, when the NRD                 
“[f]ailed to take into consideration a legally relevant factor, namely … the documents             
submitted by the appellant, … preferring [instead] its policy of requiring a certificate of              
apostasy from the Federal Territory Syariah Court.” This policy, according to Malanjum,            90
was not stipulated in the 1990 Regulations. Moreover, turning to the question of ​Wednesbury              
“unreasonableness”, he also drew attention to the matter of completing a set of forms that did                
not yet exist. For Malanjum, the NRD’s insistence on a certificate of apostasy from the               
Federal Territory Syariah Court was not only illegal but unreasonable, “[b]ecause under the             
applicable [legislation], the Syariah Court in the Federal Territory has no statutory power to              
adjudicate on the issue of apostasy.” In short, he noted, the NRD “[r]equired the              91
performance of an act that was almost impossible to perform.”  92
This statutory lacuna pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Federal Territory’s shari‘ah            
courts in matters of Muslim apostasy thus became the central issue in ​Lina Joy​. Did the NRD                 
exercise its administrative discretion in a “reasonable” manner when it sought to chart a              
course between (a) the statutory ​silence of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal             
Territories) Act (1993) and (b) the guiding jurisprudence of ​Soon Singh regarding the ​implied              
jurisdiction of the Federal Territory’s shari‘ah courts?  
Malanjum, like his colleagues on the bench, did not seek to erase the silence of the                
Federal Territories by legislating from the bench; instead, he adhered to the work of his               
predecessors in continuing to press for clearly defined laws in each state. In particular, he               
stressed that, in matters restricting constitutional rights, jurisdiction must not be “implied”.            93
Quoting the Chief Justice in ​Dalip Kaur (1997), he prioritized questions of policy-making             
and emphasized that, in light of the 1988 constitutional amendment to Article 121, clearly              
defined procedural guidance should be incorporated “[i]n all state enactments to avoid [any]             
difficulties of interpretation by the civil courts.” Indeed, even as Justice Malanjum sought to              94
stress a more substantive pattern of protection for the fundamental rights outlined in             
Malaysia’s constitution, he found it difficult to encroach upon the prerogatives of state-level             
legislative power.  
It is worth noting that Malanjum sharply differed from his colleagues on the bench              
regarding the way in which this case should be approached. Even though he engaged with               
89 ​Id. at 626. Unlike his colleagues who delivered the majority judgment, Malanjum emphasized that               
this case involved, first and foremost, crucial constitutional law questions, Hence, he argued that “[b]efore it can                 
be said that a policy is reasonable within the test of Wednesbury, its constitutionality must be first considered.”                  
Id, ​at 631. 
90 ​Id. ​at 630. 
91 ​Id.​ at 632. 
92 ​Id​. 
93 Id. ​at 636. 
94 ​Id. ​at 635. 
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questions on reasonableness, he argued that the majority had erred in considering the issue of               
reasonableness, arguing that this issue should “not have been there in the first place”. For               95
Malanjum, a constitutional question must be given priority over, and independent of, any             
“reasonableness” determination. Indeed, one of the most common frustrations with respect to            
Malaysia’s fundamental rights jurisprudence lies in the degree to which Malaysia’s courts            
have opted to side-step substantive reviews focusing on the constitutionality of decisions            
restricting fundamental rights, engaging such cases on an administrative level by invoking a             
Wednesbury test instead (thus reinforcing a pattern of judicial deference to executive            
practices). 
In any case, one of the most important ​political questions to emerge from ​Lina Joy               
concerned the extent to which various jurisdictions, including the Federal Territories, should            
be ​compelled by the judiciary to confront the issue of Muslim apostasy via explicit state-level               
enactments and, beyond this, the extent to which policies in the Federal Territories should              
reflect any particular procedural standard. Indeed, if at all Malaysia’s federal states were to              
reflect such a standard, which standard could be said to reflect a “reasonable” method for               
regulating (and recognizing) apostasy? 
Focusing on the punitive procedures in states like Kelantan, some perceived a basic             
religious aversion to ​any legalization of Muslim apostasy. Former Australian High Court            
Judge Michael Kirby and Malaysian scholars like Nurjaanah Abdullah, for instance, read            
Lina Joy​’s emphasis on the power of state-level shari‘ah courts as, ​prima facie​, a denial of                
fundamental rights. In order to protect fundamental rights, they noted, cases regarding            
Muslim apostasy must be removed from the shari‘ah courts and returned to the civil courts               
forthwith. The problem lay in the fact that it was virtually impossible to get the required                96
validation from a shari‘ah court, as references to such courts were “not merely an              
administrative or procedural requirement … [but a] control mechanism over individuals who            
wish to renounce [Islam].” Brushing past questions of administrative procedure, Abdullah           97
added that the very existence of cumbersome shari‘ah court procedures was inappropriate in             
religious freedom cases, as such procedures often willfully “ignore … the reality that whether              
or not a person has renounced Islam is … a question of fact [and] not of law.”  98
This notion—that state recognition should be based strictly on one’s private autonomy            
to choose his or her religion—is, however, rather unusual and, indeed, somewhat problematic             
at the level of state-based policy-making. Even apart from their primary focus on questions of               
administrative “reasonableness,” for instance, the majority in ​Lina Joy described various           
problems with this view, arguing that it might allow Muslims to renounce Islam merely to               
avoid certain burdens associated with Muslim personal law (e.g. constraints on the production             
of a will excluding certain heirs). A more nuanced view was, however, articulated by the then                
Chief Justice in ​Dalip Kaur ​who, seemingly mirroring the (now defunct) procedure in Johor,              
95  ​Id. ​at 631. 
96 ​See ​Michael Kirby, ​Fundamental Human Rights and Religious Apostasy: The Malaysian Case of              
Lina Joy​, 17(1) ​GRIFFITH L. REV.​ 151, 156 (2008); Abdullah, ​supra ​note 1 at 281. 
97 Abdullah ​supra ​note 1 at 283. 
98 ​Id. 
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noted that state enactments could simply impose an obligation on religious authorities to             
maintain a register of converts. Yet another approach has been adopted in Negeri Sembilan,              99
where would-be apostates are required to attend three months of rehabilitative counseling            
followed by a one-year cooling-off period (to reconsider) before receiving an official            
certificate of apostasy issued by the relevant shari‘ah court. 
These different approaches to ​proceduralizing Muslim apostasy within Malaysia’s         
shari‘ah-based courts—stretching from “punitive” Kelantan to “permissive” Negeri        
Sembilan—are important when it comes to considering what sort of state-level enactments            
could be introduced to move beyond the “implied” jurisdiction (​Soon Singh​) that bedeviled             
Lina Joy in Malaysia’s Federal Territories. However, as comparative examples, they also fail             
to answer the central ​political question: why did Malaysia’s Federal Territories persist in             
failing to specify any procedure pertaining to Muslim apostasy at all?  
 
B. Regulating Apostasy: The Political Dimension 
The last time state-level apostasy laws were enacted in Malaysia was in 2003—in             
PAS-controlled Terengganu and in BN-controlled Negeri Sembilan. The former         100
criminalized Muslim apostasy and attempted to prescribe the death penalty (a penalty that             
could not be enforced given federal statutory limits on state-level shari‘ah criminal            
punishments); the latter specified a process allowing Muslims to leave Islam with the             
certification of a state-level shari‘ah-court after various “rehabilitative” efforts were          
concluded. There were, however, other efforts to introduce apostasy regulations in Malaysia,            
including earlier efforts by the federal government and the state of Perlis in 2000. In these                101
two cases, the relevant bills fell through. The federal government’s proposal (which            
resembled the “permissive” procedures in Negeri Sembilan) never reached the floor of            
parliament for debate. And, in BN-controlled Perlis, a similar bill (specifying one year of              
rehabilitative detention rather than 30 days) was passed only to be withdrawn shortly             
thereafter on orders from the federal government. Some felt that these proposals were too               102
“soft” on apostates, but a deeper understanding of the federal government’s approach to             
apostasy legislation—precisely the sort of legislation needed to fill up the statutory and             
administrative lacuna faced by Lina Joy—requires some appreciation for the larger ​political            
context within which the government had to act.  
During the 1999 general election, the BN coalition lost significant support from its             
99 ​Id. ​at 635. 
100 ​See Section 26 of the Syariah Criminal Offence (​Hudud and Qisas​) Enactment 2003 (Terengganu);               
and, before this, Section 23 of the Syariah Criminal Code (II) Enactment 1993 (Kelantan). 
101 ​Mohd Azam Mohd Adil, ​Punishment for Apostasy: Conflict Between the Right to Freedom of               
Religion and Criminal Sentence, A Case study in Malaysia​, 1 (2) ​JURNAL CITU ​177, 189-90 (2005)​. 
102 ​Id. ​at 190. The federal “Restoration of Faith Bill” required shari‘ah court judges to advise would-be                 
converts to repent, failing which they would be detained at a rehabilitation centre for up to thirty days. (If this                    
failed, the judge would issue a declaration that the individual was no longer a Muslim.) ​See ​Santha Oorjitham, ​A                   
Matter of Personal Faith? Concern Grows Over an “Islamizing” Trend​, ​ASIAWEEK.COM​,           
http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/2000/1013/nat.malaysia.html (accessed August 31,    
2015). 
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Malay Muslim constituents (particularly in the Malay Muslim heartlands), leaving UMNO           
struggling to decide whether it should (a) articulate more restrictive policies concerning            
Muslim apostasy in a push to out-flank the conservative religious positions emphasized by             
PAS—consider the law later enacted in Terengganu (which PAS won in 1999)—or (b) stick              
to the moderate image of Islam championed by Prime Minister Mahathir. The shelving of the               
bills in Parliament and in Perlis was framed by an effort to avoid any hasty decisions on such                  
a politically sensitive issue. Indeed, shortly after these two bills were set aside in 2000, the                
government launched a series of consultations to discuss Malaysia’s approach to religious            
affairs with Muslim scholars from several different parts of the world.   103
The political circumstances surrounding Joy’s quest to delete the word “Islam” from            
her ID card clearly featured many of the issues addressed in an article by Tamir Moustafa.                104
Describing the need for would-be converts to obtain a certificate of apostasy from a shari‘ah               
court as a procedural “dead end,” Moustafa turns away from the Federal Court’s decision to               
accept this requirement (as a constitutional matter related to Malaysian federalism and the             
Court’s reluctance to legislate from the bench), focusing, instead, on a set of ​political debates               
emerging ​after the Court’s decision to treat this administrative requirement as “reasonable”.            
On the one hand, he notes that so-called liberal Muslims were concerned that Malaysia’s civil               
courts “were beginning to cede broad legal authority [to shari‘ah courts], even when it meant               
trampling on individual rights.” And, yet, at the same time, he notes that conservative              105
Muslims believed that Lina Joy’s claims threatened “the Muslim community’s          
[constitutional] ability to manage its own religious affairs” within the context of Malaysia’s             
state-level shari‘ah courts. The central tension, he argues, lay in the fact that Muslim              106
liberals saw ​all administrative regulations pertaining to conversion as a violation of            
fundamental rights, whereas Muslim conservatives believed that ​any form of apostasy           
legalization threatened the integrity of their religious community.   107
Moustafa’s focus on post hoc polarization reveals how both sides saw the link             
between religious self-identification and the administrative procedures underpinning state         
recognition. However, he does not explain why the procedural lacuna that shaped Lina Joy’s              
case existed in the first place; nor does he explain why the administrative barriers created by                
this gap were seen as “reasonable” by the courts. In fact, although the political polarization               
that Moustafa describes existed in many parts of Malaysia, most states actually ​did manage to               
produce some form of explicit legislation governing Muslim apostasy. Indeed, the main            
question pertaining to the operationalization of religious freedom in ​Lina Joy is: why did this               
policy-making process ​fail​ in Malaysia’s Federal Territories (and at least four other states)?  
One of the most intriguing efforts to explain this policy-based (and administrative)            
103 ​See SUARAM, ​MALAYSIAN HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN 2000 ​51-2 (2000);               
and Dr M: No Hasty Decision on Apostasy, ​NEW STRAITS TIMES​, ​30 September 2000 at 2. 
104 Moustafa, ​supra​ note 16. 
105 ​Id.​ at 139. 
106 ​Id.​ at 148. 
107 Ultimately, Moustafa blames the publicity surrounding ​Lina Joy for making earlier workarounds             
(allowing for the recognition of conversion by lawyers and shari‘ah court judges supporting a simple change of                 
name) more difficult. ​Id. ​at 151. 
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lacuna has been advanced by Kikue Hamayotsu, who asks why powerful UMNO politicians             
like Prime Ministers Mahathir (1981-2003), Badawi (2003-09), and Razak (2009-) chose to            
abandon the introduction of new apostasy laws at ​both the federal ​and the state levels ​despite                
“significant Muslim support for [apostasy] regulation” in civil society and government.           108
Referring to the fact that JAKIM had proposed a new federal law seeking to regulate Muslim                
apostasy in 2000, Hamayotsu notes that Mahathir, Badawi, and Razak repeatedly set aside             
their proposal owing to “constitutional constraints and … technical shortcomings”. In fact,            109
she argues, they highlighted “technical” shortcomings to avoid addressing what she sees as             
politically divisive “core” questions concerning the status of religious freedom.   110
The basis for Hamayotsu’s argument rests on her contention that longstanding           
patterns of UMNO-PAS competition for Malay Muslim votes are not sufficient to explain the              
emergence (or non-emergence) of specific policies regarding the regulation of Muslim           
apostasy. Broadly, she notes that more attention should be paid to the finer nuances of               
electoral politics and, specifically, BN’s growing dependence on Malaysia’s ​non-Muslim          
voters. Above all, in her effort to explain the abandonment of policy initiatives concerning              
Muslim apostasy, Hamayotsu suggests that electoral considerations compelled UMNO to          
avoid introducing any “shari‘ah-based” measure that might be seen as detrimental to            
non-Muslim (especially Chinese) interests, quoting a President of the Malaysian Chinese           
Association (MCA) who expressed his “rejection of Islamic law, and apostasy law in             
particular, being applied to [existing or erstwhile] non-Muslims.” In short, Hamayotsu           111
argues that laws governing Muslim apostasy were not introduced because doing so would             
alienate non-Muslim voters. 
Unfortunately, Hamayotsu ignores the degree to which state-level laws governing          
Muslim apostasy ​were introduced in several BN-controlled states with sizable non-Muslim           
populations—for example, in Sabah (35% Chinese), Melaka (35% Chinese), and Perak           
(30%), not to mention Negeri Sembilan (23%). In fact core features of Hamayotsu’s             
argument do not add up in the state-level political contexts she considers. She also notes               112
that Malaysia’s UMNO-led federal government could have pursued harsh apostasy laws to            
appease its core constituency (i.e. Muslims). But, in the end, it did not. Evidently, the               113
political forces underpinning the federal government’s decision to ​avoid new legislation           
concerning Muslim apostasy may be more complex than Hamayotsu suggests. As we note             
below, the main factors may be more closely tied to an historically and politically nuanced               
understanding of the “constitutional” and “technical” factors Hamayotsu initially rejects.  
108 Hamayotsu, ​supra​ note 16 at 400. 
109 ​Id. ​at 409 – 10. 
110 ​Id. 
111 ​Id. ​at 412. The MCA supported a set of changes in Malaysia’s Marriage and Divorce Act following                  
a 2007 Federal Court ruling (​Subashini​) in which a spouse in a civil marriage who later converted to Islam was                    
allowed to return to the civil courts for a divorce.  
112 Even in the four states that ​failed to introduce state-level procedures governing Muslim apostasy, it                
is unlikely that the votes of “previously non-Muslim” Muslims were more decisive than those of “born”                
Muslims who found themselves in the same legal limbo. 
113 Hamayotsu, ​supra​ note 16 at 414. 
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Before illuminating these factors, it is worth pointing out that concerns regarding            
non-Muslim voters may have played some role. As UMNO lost electoral ground to PAS in               
1999, it was generally non-Malay / non-Muslim voters who pulled the BN to victory. In fact                
the BN’s success in 2004 was attributed to a return of Malay Muslim voters as well as the                  
continued support of non-Malays. Still, this story regarding the political role played by             
non-Muslim voters does not extend beyond 2004. In 2008, the BN secured just 35% of all                
Chinese votes and 48% of Indian votes; and, in 2013 (one year after Hamayotsu’s article was                
published), these figures dropped to just 23% and 45%, respectively, with ​no discernable             
effect on BN’s approach to the regulation of Muslim apostasy. If Hamayotsu’s argument             114
were correct, this reduction in non-Muslim support should have allowed the BN to introduce              
greater restrictions on Muslim apostasy to compete more directly with PAS. It did not.  
The question is: Why did the regulatory landscape surrounding Muslim apostasy           
remain so patchy? And, with specific reference to Lina Joy, why did this patchiness persist in                
the form of a statutory-cum-administrative lacuna in Malaysia’s Federal Territories? This is,            
we argue, the key political question bearing on the administrative operationalization of            
religious freedom in ​Lina Joy​. The source of this lacuna is not limited to intra-Muslim               
divisions or Muslim/non-Muslim divisions. Its source is tied to specific features of            
Malaysia’s federal constitution—especially, its rather delicate balance between “federal” and          
“state-level” laws concerning the regulation of Islam. 
 
C. Regulating Apostasy: Federal-State Legal and Political Relations 
In order to explain why the introduction of specific procedures governing Muslim            
apostasy in Malaysia’s Federal Territories was so difficult and, indeed, why the resulting             
administrative gap was seen as “reasonable” by Malaysia’s Federal Court, we focus on the              
country’s constitutional setup and, specifically, the rather delicate (and, to some extent,            
unresolved) tension between federal and state-level power, particularly in matters pertaining           
to religion.  115
While Malaysia’s scheme of federalism is center-heavy—List I of the Constitution’s           
Ninth Schedule mentions 27 matters in which the federal parliament possesses exclusive            
legislative competence; List II assigns only 13 matters exclusively to the states—the first of              
these 13 state-level matters concerns Islamic law. Despite the common assumption that all             116
“Islamic” matters are within the exclusive purview of the states, and despite the fact that               
state-level sultans remain the Heads of Islam in their respective state territories, however, the              
114 Shah quotes an UMNO Supreme Council member who explained that before the 2013 polls, the BN                 
coalition had come to believe that non-Malay support was almost a “lost cause.” Shah, ​supra ​note 23 at 385. 
115 Referring to the approach adopted by the Federal Court in ​Lina Joy, ​Shah and Sani describe                 
Malaysia’s approach to the administrative procedures linking self-identification to state recognition as a             
“technicality”. “It is frustrating for citizens who resort to the highest court in the land to uphold their rights,”                   
they write, “only to see their appeals being turned down on technicalities”. Dian A. H. Shah and Mohd                  
Azizuddin Mohd Sani, ​Freedom of Religion in Malaysia: A Tangled Web of Legal, Political, and Social Issues,                 
36 ​NORTH CAROLINA J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG.​ 647, 655 (2011). 
116 ​See supra ​section I.A. 
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federation’s powers in matters pertaining to Islam are not entirely excluded. It is in fact               117
worth recalling that the punitive jurisdiction of Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts is            
capped by the federation’s Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act of 1965, which limits             
state-level shari’ah-court punishments to three years imprisonment, fines up to MYR5000,           
and six lashes.   118
List II reserves the power to create and punish offences against the precepts of Islam               
(including apostasy) to state legislatures and, in the case of the Federal Territories, the federal               
parliament. Yet, if the latter were to amend the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal              
Territories) Act of 1993, introducing new legislation regarding apostasy that differed from            
any state law—either in a more “permissive” direction like Negeri Sembilan or, together with              
an amendment in the Syariah Courts Jurisdiction Act of 1965, a more “punitive” direction              
including capital punishment (which only the federation can impose)—a number of rather            
awkward political questions could arise regarding the ensuing divergence of laws. To be sure,              
parliament can introduce laws applying exclusively to the Federal Territories; as such, federal             
laws in the Federal Territories do not automatically imply a push for statutory harmonization.              
However, ​politically​, ​given the direct involvement of the federal parliament in the            
promulgation of such legislation and the expanding role of JAKIM, ​federal-state divergence            
is complicated. Indeed, what signal would the promulgation of federal legislation regarding            
Muslim apostasy send to state-level lawmakers and, more specifically, the state-level sultans            
recognized as the Heads of Islam in their states?   119
Given the ​Majlis Raja-Raja’s prior decision to approve forms of national           
standardization in all areas of Islamic law ​except criminal law—indeed, given the absence of              
any other Muslim criminal law applying exclusively to the Federal Territories—it may be             
that explicit parliamentary action addressing criminal cases of apostasy in the Federal            
Territories would be seen as an early (and threatening) indication that the federal government              
wanted Malaysia’s sultans to move much further in the direction of “federal standards”.             
Precisely insofar as the federal government’s proposals in 2000 (resembling those of Negeri             
Sembilan) were considered “too permissive”, it may be that, notwithstanding judicial           
guidance pressing for appropriate legislation in each “state-level” jurisdiction (​Soon Singh​;           
Md Hakim Lee​), powerful ​political calculations have pushed Malaysia’s parliament toward           
117 Laws on Islamic banking, finance, and insurance, for instance, would fall within the purview of the                 
federal parliament. 
118 See Jaclyn L. Neo and Dian A. H. Shah, ​Hudud and the Struggle for Malaysia’s Constitutional Soul,                  
Constitutionnet, June 25, 2015, available at:      
http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/hudud-and-struggle-malaysias-constitutional-soul (last accessed May 5,     
2016). 
119 Alluding to related forms of pressure, Ramizah Wan Mohammad describes the work of JKSM, a                
federal department in the Prime Minister’s office supporting the administration of Malaysia’s shari‘ah courts              
(once again subject to state-level consent). She notes that ‘JKSM has created Syariah Court laws for the Federal                  
Territory of Kuala Lumpur, [but it] is ​expected that states in Malaysia will follow the Federal Territories Acts”                  
(emphasis added). ​The Administration of Syariah Courts in Malaysia 1957-2009​, ​JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC LAW AND               
CULTURE 13 (2011) at 250. See also Tamir Moustafa, ​Judging in God’s Name: State Power, Secularism, and the                  
Politics of Islamic Law in Malaysia​, ​OXFORD JOURNAL OF LAW AND RELIGION 3:1 (2014) at 152, 158, 161; Moustafa                   
notes that Malaysia’s state-level laws typically follow, and mirror, those enacted in the Federal Territories. 
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the promulgation of ​no legislation instead. It may be that, via ​no legislation, the government               
has been able to advance two of its most enduring goals at once: on the one hand, mollifying                  
the anxieties of Malaysia’s regional sultans (jealous of their religious sovereignty); on the             
other, depriving the opposition (PAS) of an opportunity to criticize its legislation as “too              
soft”.  
Because the federal government, through ​JAKIM, has repeatedly stepped up its           
efforts to standardize state-level Islamic laws, particularly those on Muslim personal matters            
such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, such political considerations are not           
inconceivable. Indeed, from an historical perspective, efforts to encourage centralization in           120
matters pertaining to Islam can only be described as controversial, particularly in light of              
longstanding frictions regarding the balance between federal and state-level powers.          
Malaysia’s sultans explicitly raised strong reservations during Malaysia’s pre-independence         
constitution-making process about the inclusion of a provision cementing Islam as the            
religion of the Malayan federation (fearing that such a provision would shift the locus of               
authority in Islamic matters to the central government). It is only ​after these sultans received               
clear assurances that their regional authority in matters regarding Islam would ​not be lost that               
they agreed to the inclusion of this provision. In fact the sultans were assured that, even ​if a                  
federal government department were established to address religious matters, that department           
would ​not exist under the purview of Malaysia’s elected government—as it does (in the form               
of JAKIM) today. Instead, they were assured that such a department would only serve to               
“coordinate” the federation and the states under the purview of Malaysia’s rotating king (i.e.              
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong). In other words, when it comes to Islam, the sultans associated               121
with Malaysia’s states are jealous of their state-level legislative power. 
Since the earliest days of the constitution-making process, regional sultans          
have registered persistent concerns about the effect of non-Muslim proselytization amongst           
Muslims, with a particular focus on the “criminal” matter of Muslim apostasy​. This is              122
unsurprising insofar as Malaysia’s sultans ​derive their authority from “[M]uslim notions of            
… rule.” Indeed, while the federal parliament may well pass laws to regulate the process of                123
Muslim apostasy in Malaysia’s Federal Territories, doing so would almost certainly stir up a              
host of constitutional and political questions regarding the shape of Malaysian federalism            
with respect to the terms of Islam, religious policy-making, and the religious prerogatives of              
Malaysia’s hereditary sultans.  
The statutory gap facing Lina Joy was awkward; but, for specific historical,            
120 Consider the experience with efforts to harmonize Islamic family law in the early 1980s. The federal                 
parliament enacted its model law for the Federal Territories, which Penang, Perak, and Terengganu              
subsequently followed. Kelantan, however, enacted its own model law, which was preferred in Melaka. ​See               
Maria Luisa Seda-Poulin, ​Islamization and Legal Reform in Malaysia: The Hudud Controversy of 1992​,              
SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS​ 224, 230 (1993). 
121 Shah, ​supra​ note 25 at 92. 
122 ​Id. at 112. It was for this reason that the sultans objected to the inclusion the right to propagate one’s                     
religion in the constitution. 
123 ​See ​M. B. Hooker, ​Muhammadan Law and Islamic Law, in ​ISLAM IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA ​160, 171 (M.                  
B. Hooker, ed.) and ​DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 226 (2000). 
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constitutional, and political reasons, it is not difficult to understand why the behavior of the               
NRD, drawing attention to state-level shari‘ah-court procedures and, therein, the need for a             
covering law promulgated by the relevant legislature, was considered legally “reasonable.”           
Indeed, in this sense, even the acknowledgement of a glaring lacuna limiting the fundamental              
rights of Lina Joy was thought to serve, in some sense, a legitimate public interest—a               
legitimate interest in Malaysian federalism and its approach to the separation of powers             
(centre vs. state; executive vs. sultan; federal judiciary vs. state-level legislatures) as well as              
an interest in avoiding violent forms of religious criticism within the public at large.   
To guarantee harmony between the versions of Islamic law that are applied in             
different units of the Malaysian federation, some have suggested that Malaysia should have a              
Grand Mufti “whose opinions would bind all Muslims.” However, returning to Malaysia’s            124
constitutional and political arrangements, Farid Shuaib notes that this suggestion has not met             
with a positive response. “The federal government could not establish such an office”, he              
explains, “unless the states voluntarily agree to subordinate their Muftis to a federal Mufti,”              
and this is “something … the states have resisted.” Turning specifically to the pattern of               125
statutory inaction that frustrated Lina Joy, Shuaib notes that the creation of a Grand Mufti               
able to make fatwas for the whole of Malaysia would require a constitutional amendment.              
But Malaysia’s regional sultans “have shown their readiness to be firm in situation[s] related              
to their position.” Indeed, the constitutional amendment needed to specify a national            126
punishment for the “crime” of Muslim apostasy was not introduced during the 50 years that               
UMNO and its BN coalition held the requisite two-thirds majority in parliament (1957-2008).             
With the demise of that super majority, the policy-making context pertaining to the regulation              
of Muslim apostasy and, therein, the operationalization of religious freedom has shifted; in             
short, the possibility of introducing a national “Grand Mufti” via the promulgation of a              
constitutional amendment has declined. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The right to freely choose one’s religion (i.e. religious self-identification) and the            
formal procedures underpinning a state’s recognition of one’s faith are closely linked. They             
are tied together by administrative procedures, but the procedures considered “reasonable”           
vary from place to place in ways that directly shape the operationalization of religious              
freedom as a “right”. In Malaysia, the operationalization of religious freedom is shaped by              
specific administrative procedures, but historical, constitutional, and political contingencies         
have shaped the way in which the procedures considered “reasonable” have been designed,             
including their absence in Malaysia’s Federal Territories. These ​contingencies explain          
124 Shuaib (2012), ​supra ​note 28 at 111. 
125 ​Id. ​As Shuaib points out, “[t]here is a National Fatwa Committee, which was set up in 1970 and is                    
currently placed within the Department of Islam of Malaysia in the Prime Minister’s Office. This Committee                
may deliberate on issues relating to Islam but its recommendation … is not binding on the states.”  
126 Shuaib (2008), ​supra ​note 28 at 451. 
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Malaysia’s failure to close the procedural gap that prevented Lina Joy from transforming her              
religious “self-identification” into a case of “state recognition.”  
Conventionally, religious freedom is understood as a negative right, suggesting that           
states must not encroach on an individual’s freedom to choose or change her religion.              
Precisely insofar as this right is guaranteed by state power, however, this formulation fails to               
appreciate the relationship between religious self-identification and the (historically         
contingent) administrative procedures underpinning state recognition. Indeed, the central         
issue in most cases is as follows: when do the administrative procedures underpinning state              
recognition amount to an “unreasonable” restriction on the manifestation of one’s religious            
identity? At what point do administrative procedures become “unreasonable” in ways that            
constitute an abuse of human rights? 
The case of ​Lina Joy reminds us that there is much to be gained (analytically) from a                 
detailed ​empirical ​understanding of the relationship between religious self-identification and          
the historically and politically contingent questions of administrative “reasonableness” that          
underpin each state’s recognition of religious identity (and, thus, its manifestation in the             
public realm). It is this ​empirical understanding of administrative “reasonableness” that, we            
argue, deserves more attention by those with an interest in the operationalization of religious              
freedom worldwide. 
Registration requirements for religious identity are not uncommon. Aside from the           
Malaysian, American, and British cases of individual religious identity mentioned above, a            
study of 153 states with constitutional guarantees pertaining to freedom of worship shows             
that 42% impose some form of registration requirement with reference to religious groups.             127
Indeed, even amongst those that constitutionalize a separation of religion and state, fully 86%              
enforce some form of religious-registration laws. Again, ​Lina Joy ​reminds us that religious             128
freedom is protected ​so long as specific administrative procedures underpinning state-based           
recognition are satisfied. Asking Lina Joy to follow a set of procedures that did not yet exist                 
may seem unreasonable; but, again, judgments of reasonableness are historically and           
politically contingent.  
A ​Wednesbury ​test of administrative discretion seeks to identify cases in which state             
actors proceeding within a legislative grant of administrative discretion have, nevertheless,           
arrived at a decision that is “repugnant to all reason.” Moreover, such tests seek to               129
highlight cases in which “some quality of perversity, arbitrariness, caprice, or absurdity” is             
present. The bar for unreasonableness is, thus, very high. In fact, as a political matter, tests                 130
of ​Wednesbury “unreasonableness” are widely understood to carve out a very broad “zone of              
immunity” protecting executive action from intrusive expressions of judicial review. This           131
127 Jonathan Fox and Deborah Flores, ​Religions, Constitutions, and the State: A Cross-National Study​,              
41(4)​ J. POL.​ 1499, 1509 (2009). 
128 ​Id. ​at 1510. 
129 Peiris, ​supra ​note 6 at 55. 
130 ​Id. ​at 56. 
131 Mark Elliot, ​The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review​, 60(2) ​CAMBRIDGE                
L. J​. 301, 306 (2001). For criticism of the shift, within British jurisprudence, from a focus on (a) ​Wednesbury                   
deference to administrative authority to (b) judge-led notions of proportionality, see Poole; Allan. 
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pattern may have shifted in Europe and the U.K. But, as noted above, this is not the case in                   
Malaysia. 
In Malaysia, what many continue to see as an unreasonable administrative burden (or             
lacuna) was weighed against the constitutional and political implications associated with a            
Muslim exercising her religious freedom in a completely unfettered way, i.e. converting away             
from Islam without any prior approval from the relevant Islamic authorities. Given the             
negative sentiment broadly but not universally associated with Muslim apostasy in Malaysia            
(not to mention the media attention surrounding Lina Joy’s case), Malaysia’s Federal Court             
was clearly concerned that a decision in Joy’s favor would create a political backlash from               
more conservative Muslims, not to mention a broader political clash involving Malaysia’s            
regional sultans. There was also a concern that such a decision would jeopardize both the               
integrity and the security of Malaysia’s Muslim community as a whole. This is clear in the                
Court’s assertion that, had there been no limit on Muslim apostasy (that is, if Muslims were                
allowed to convert in and out of the religion as and when they wished), the community itself                 
would fall into a state of “chaos.”  132
In light of previous decisions like ​Md Hakim Lee​, the lingering absence of explicit              
statutory provisions governing apostasy in the Federal Territories was not enough to persuade             
Malaysia’s Federal Court that the NRD’s conditions (requiring a certificate of apostasy from             
a shari‘ah court) were “unreasonable”. On the contrary, turning to questions of institutional             
competence, the Court held that it was entirely reasonable for the NRD to require such a                
certificate because apostasy was a matter to be addressed by religious experts according to              
Islamic principles. Requiring such a certificate, in other words, was within the ambit of the               
statutory discretion afforded to the NRD, and, more importantly, not so illogical (within the              
context of Malaysia’s religious federalism) as to fall foul of a ​Wednesbury            
“unreasonableness” test. Indeed, the question of reasonableness in ​Lina Joy implicated a            133
particularly sensitive feature of inter-branch politics: for historical, political, and          
constitutional reasons, the Federal Court simply refused to encroach on Malaysia’s state-level            
shari’ah courts (and, by extension, Malaysia’s state-level legislatures or sultans) in matters            
pertaining to Islam. More specifically, it was conscious not to disrupt the constitution’s             
delicate approach to centre-state relations in matters pertaining to shari‘ah. The Court            
believed that there was a clear constitutional mandate under the Ninth Schedule for             
Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts to address such matters. Indeed, this exercise of judicial             
restraint in the face of complex political considerations and institutional competencies           
(underpinned by references to administrative “reasonableness”) is not unusual in          
common-law jurisdictions worldwide.  
In complex decisions framed by “political” constitutions that respect the notion of            
parliamentary primacy, the fact that political considerations underlie the operation of           
Wednesbury unreasonableness tests is well-established. And, yet, precisely insofar as this is            
the case, one wonders how a particular human right, constitutionally defined as a             
132 ​Lina Joy, supra​ note 3 at 612. 
133 For analogous considerations in Europe, ​see​ Jowell, ​supra ​note 73. 
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“fundamental” right, can ever serve as a stable check on state power if, in due course, its                 
operationalization is tied to politically contingent assessments of administrative         
“reasonable-ness” or, for that matter, a “proportional” appreciation for legitimate public           
interests? This is an important question that, we feel, deserves more attention in the literature               
on fundamental human rights.   134
Malaysia’s Federal Court concluded that the NRD had acted “reasonably” in the sense             
of arriving at a course of administrative action that made sense within the context of               
Malaysian history, ​Malaysian politics, and ​Malaysian constitutional law. In short, the Court            
concluded that the NRD’s decision was not “so wrong that no reasonable person [​in              
Malaysia​] could sensibly be expected to reach it”. Again, the meaning of reasonableness is              
always historically and politically contingent. But, precisely insofar as this is the case, we              
argue that the ​operationalization of religious freedom as a fundamental right, located ​in             
between​ religious self-identification and state recognition, is ​also​ (politically) contingent.  
Can a defense of fundamental rights be ensured even ​after the administrative            
operationalization of those rights is foregrounded? Writing shortly after the promulgation of            
Britain’s Human Rights Act in 1998, Mark Elliot argued that the standard of substantive              
review in English administrative law must now be viewed against a “constitutional backdrop”             
within which the Human Rights Act “forms a fundamental part.” But, even ​before this Act               135
came into force, Elliot explains that British courts had already begun to develop a doctrine of                
common law constitutional rights in which human rights cases were increasingly reviewed            
using the same proportionality analysis associated with the European Court of Human Rights.            
Even in administrative law cases, he explains, British courts had begun to embrace “a               136
reconstructed version of the ​Wednesbury doctrine.” Where British judges identified that a            137
fundamental right had been restricted by an administrative procedure, they insisted on            
assessing the public-interest justification for that restriction. “Reasonableness” remained at          138
the heart of such enquiries, ensuring that executive agents were still provided with a margin               
of administrative discretion. But, as Elliot explains, following T.R. Hickman, this           
“super-​Wednesbury​” approach provided for a far more rigorous review of administrative           
decisions—one that actively foregrounded the importance of fundamental human rights.          139
Even a “reasonableness” assessment, in other words, need not preclude a serious            
consideration of rights.   140
134 With reference to the shift in British jurisprudence from ​Wednesbury ‘reasonableness’ tests to more               
thoroughgoing ‘proportionality’ tests after the European Court of Human Rights decision in ​Smith and Grady v.                
United Kingdom​, ​see​ Rivers, ​supra ​note 6. 
135 Elliot, ​supra ​note 130 at 336. 
136 ​Id. ​at 326; see also Rivers ​supra ​note 6; Poole, ​supra ​note 4; and Jowell and Lester, ​supra ​note 6. 
137 Elliot, ​supra ​note 130 at 312. 
138 T. R. Hickman, ​The Reasonableness Principle: Reassessing Its Place in the Public Sphere, 63(1)               
CAMBRIDGE L. J​. 166, 185-6 (2004). 
139 Elliot, ​supra ​note 130 at 314. ​See ​also​ ​Hickman, ​id.​ at 186. 
140 In ​Casey (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court held that services (e.g. medical services) related to a                 
constitutional right (a right to abortion) may be regulated. In this case, an “undue” or “unreasonable” burden                 
could include “unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle                
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In the future, we may see a similar shift enabling fundamental rights to serve as a                
more effective check on executive power in Malaysia. We simply argue that any effort to               
grasp such a transition will require an appreciation for the political dynamics underpinning             
Malaysia’s​ constitutional experience.  
 
to a woman seeking an abortion.” Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court has increasingly intervened to regulate                
state-level administrative procedures (e.g. official forms) pertaining to state and federal rights like marriage or               
religious freedom, the Malaysian Federal Court has, for historical and political reasons of its own, shied away                 
from any similar assertion of federal supremacy, exercising considerably more restraint. This is closer to the                
U.S. Supreme Court’s Erie doctrine, which tries to discourage forum-shopping where the jurisdictions of federal               
and state-level courts overlap by encouraging federal judges to decide cases in ways that mirror the laws of the                   
state in question.​ See​ Redding, ​supra​ note 9. 
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